This paper f ocuses o n th e dom estic e nergy policies of in du1strialised states and, in particular, those states which have b een at the forefro nt in applying neo -liberal poli cies to the reform and restructuring of their energy supply industries. It examines the interactions between the neo-liberal and climate change mitig ation a gendas, a s th ey h ave be en applied to en ergy poli cy, an d the consequences the se inte ractions a re having for energy security, which i s a co re o bjective o f energy poli cy for all states. A ca se study approach is ta ken using the Un ited Kingdom and Australia as examples. The overall conclusion is that if states set themselves ambitious emissions reduction go als they will need to make radical c hanges to their energy sy stems, which, i n the absence of d ecisive p olicy actio n, are l ikely to be deleterious to domestic energy security. By contrast, mo dest redu ction goal s will not requi re far-reaching e nergy sy stem chan ges an d will pose little threat to energy security, but will also do little to mitigate climate change.
• affordability is the provision of energy at a price which does not adversely impact on the competitiveness of the economy and which supports continued investment in the energy sector.' (Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2009, p. 5) These words amount to a specification of the objectives of energy policy as a whole, that is, for the objectives of government actions relating to the provision of energy, both today, and historically for as far back as governments, either national or sub-national, have taken such actions. The argument advanced in this paper is that it is energy security in this broad sense which affects and is affected by policies directed towards mitigating the effects of climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, which requires the use of fossil fuels to be constrained. It is further argued that this is the case largely as a consequence of other energy policies implemented over the past twenty years or so, specifically the economic liberalisation of the supply of electricity and gas within the domestic markets.
At the outset it is worth defining the overall context, well known as this is. Firstly, industrial manufacturing processes, and the high levels of material consumption which they allow, require the high intensity use of large quantities of energy. Until the last few decades, and with the limited exception of hydro-electricity, this could only be achieved by the use of fossil fuels. Economic activity today is still overwhelmingly dependent on the combustion of fossil fuels. Secondly, for all developed countries, and for the world as a whole, the combustion of fossil fuels to supply energy is by far the most important source of greenhouse gas emissions. Any effective action to achieve substantial reductions in emissions must involve large reductions in the combustion of fossil fuels. and transporting crude oil and petroleum products led to a steady reduction in the real price of petroleum and to the use of petroleum products, mostly replacing coal, in a far wider range of energy applications.
Nevertheless, and despite many new discoveries of crude oil, significant production remained confined to relatively few countries, and most countries, both developed and developing, remained heavily dependent on imports to meet their requirements for petroleum.
The First Oil Shock exposed the resultant economic and social vulnerabilities in importing countries when petroleum supply was disrupted. The IEA's initial stated aims (1982) were: i) Co-operation among IEA Participating Countries to reduce excessive dependence on oil through energy conservation, development of alternative energy sources and energy research and development;
ii) An information system on the international oil market as well as consultation with oil companies;
iii) Co-operation with oil producing and other oil consuming countries with a view to developing a stable international energy trade as well as the rational management and use of world energy resources in the interest of all countries; iv) A plan to prepare Participating Countries against the risk of a major disruption of oil supplies and to share available oil in the event of an emergency.
The strong emphasis on oil supply security is obvious in the second, third and fourth points.
However, it is the first point, and in particular the prominence given to energy conservation (now called end use energy efficiency), which is the most important change from the past.
While the development of new energy supply sources, and support for the associated research and development activity, had previously been prominent features of national energy policies, end use efficiency never had been. That end use efficiency could make national energy systems less vulnerable to disruption and enhance overall economic welfare was a new idea for governments and a clear break with the pre-1973 energy policies of member countries.
Of course the policy positions advocated by the IEA partially reflect the collective position of member countries. By the early 1980s, following the Second Oil Shock of 1979, most, including both the United Kingdom and Australia, had in place policies to promote greater end use energy efficiency, to encourage fuel substitution away from petroleum to other established supply options, including coal, natural gas and nuclear energy (in Australia's case, not the latter), and to support the development of new energy supply options, including renewable energy. While many of these policy directions, such as promoting increased energy efficiency and the use of nuclear energy, had the incidental effect of curbing increased emissions of greenhouse gas emissions (although at the time these were not an energy policy concern), others, most notably promoting the substitution of coal for oil in electricity generation, had the opposite effect.
The official history of the first twenty years of the IEA notes that in 1974 'energy security [was] the paramount policy objective of the IEA' (Scott, 1995, p.35) . However, by the time that history was published, two years after the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed, priorities had widened:
The notion of energy security has […] been broadened to include the need to strike the optimal balance among policies for energy security, environmental protection, and economic growth. It is clear that the environment element will continue as one of the driving forces of energy policy in the years to come (Scott, 1995, p.41 ).
This widening of priorities was formally embodied in the 'IEA Shared Goals', which were formally adopted by Ministers in 1993, effectively replacing the initial aims quoted above.
The 'Shared Goals' emphasise enhanced energy use efficiency, diversified and efficient energy supply, and the liberalisation of both domestic and international energy markets (Scott, 1994, p.41) .
In the years since, the centrality of 'the environment element', most particularly climate change, to the policy research activities and the policy recommendations of the IEA has steadily increased. In 2004 the Agency took a further step by including in its annual 'flagship' publication, World Energy Outlook an 'Alternative Policy Scenario' for the global energy future, which, it said:
analyses, for the first time, the global impact of environmental and energysecurity policies that countries around the world are already considering, as well as the effects of faster deployment of energy-efficient technologies. In this scenario, global energy demand and carbon-dioxide emissions are significantly lower than in our Reference Scenario (IEA, 2004, p. 30 'transform the way we use energy', by which was meant increasing the efficiency with which energy is used, and diversifying the energy supply mix, including greater use of renewables.
The IEA was nominated as the lead body for supporting and promoting these changes and the detailed commitments under each of these two major headings amounted to a significant new work program for the Agency. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the future of human prosperity depends on how successfully we tackle the two central energy challenges facing us today: securing the supply of reliable and affordable energy and effecting a rapid transformation to a low-carbon, efficient and environmentally benign system of energy supply. What is needed is little short of an energy revolution. […] Securing energy supplies and speeding up the transition to a low-carbon energy system both call for radical action by governments -at national and local levels, and through participation in co-ordinated international mechanisms. Households, businesses and motorists will have to change the way they use energy, while energy suppliers will need to invest in developing and commercialising lowcarbon technologies. To make this happen, governments have to put in place appropriate financial incentives and regulatory frameworks that support both energy security and climate-policy goals in an integrated way.
It will be for national governments to determine what financial incentives and regulatory frameworks they consider appropriate. The remainder of this paper examines the very different positions adopted by the United Kingdom and Australia.
United Kingdom
In 2008 the United Kingdom derived 40 per cent of its primary energy consumption from natural gas, just under 36 per cent from petroleum and 16 per cent from coal. Nuclear and renewables supplied the remaining 8 per cent. Imports supplied about three quarters of coal and one quarter of natural gas. Petroleum was both exported and imported in significant volumes, but in net terms imports exceeded exports by an amount equal to somewhat less than one tenth of consumption (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2010a). Until the early 1970s, the United Kingdom was amongst the world's largest coal producers, but production has declined steadily since then, to the present low level. During the 1980s and 1990s, when production of natural gas and petroleum from the North Sea was at its highest levels, the United Kingdom was a net exporter of energy. However, these resources are now in long term decline, and, in the absence of decisive policy action, import dependence is expected to grow steadily (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009b). Security of supply of fossil fuels is thus a major concern for the United Kingdom. The main sources of primary energy for electricity generation are gas, coal and nuclear, accounting respectively Most of this decrease occurred in the early 1990s, when there was extensive substitution of gas for coal, particularly in electricity generation (the so-called 'dash for gas'). The decrease in energy related emissions from 2000 to 2008 was 2.6 per cent.4
The United Kingdom led the world in the introduction of liberalised markets in the supply of electricity and gas. The state owned monopoly gas supply business was privatised in the late 1980s. In 1990 the electricity supply business was privatised and competition introduced into the generation of electricity. Competition in the supply of both electricity and gas to consumers was introduced in the late 1990s. All elements of the UK energy supply industry are now privately owned.
The United Kingdom could be considered to have formally adopted an energy policy framework integrating climate change and supply security objectives when it issued its 2003
Energy White Paper. The White Paper (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003, p. 6) summarised what it called the three energy policy challenges facing the United Kingdom in the following terms.
Our country needs a new energy policy. Despite the improvements we have made over the last five years, today's policy will not meet tomorrow's challenges. We need to address the threat of climate change. We must deal with the implications of reduced UK oil, gas and coal production, which will make us a net energy importer instead of an energy exporter. And over the next twenty years or so we will need to replace or update much of our energy infrastructure.
Both the second and third of these 'challenges' -reduced domestic fossil fuel production and the need for increased investment -represent threats to energy security in the medium to long term. Consistent with the approach advocated by the IEA, energy efficiency and renewable efficiency were seen as very important in addressing both climate change and security challenges. On the specific issue of long term investment needs in electricity supply and distribution infrastructure, the White Paper was confident that the existing market structures, together with the various programs to promote renewable generation, such as the Importantly, the White Paper went on to state:
On its own emissions trading will not be enough to deliver our environmental goals. We will need additional measures, for example to stimulate further energy efficiency in business, in the public sector and in households (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003, p. 14) .
In 2005 This document reduced the energy policy challenges to two: 'tackling climate change'
and 'delivering secure, clean energy at affordable prices'. It identified achieving the right volume and type of investment in new electricity generation capacity as a key issue. Pointing out that up to 25 GW of new capacity would be required over the next two decades, mainly to replace closing coal and nuclear power stations, it noted that, on then current projections, much of this 'generation gap' would be met by gas fired plant. This would increase the already high proportion of electricity generation fuelled by gas, with supply security implications, given the increasing dependence on imported gas. It would also lock-in, for the life of the new plants, higher emissions than would be the case if renewables and/or nuclear were to supply more of the new capacity. The document emphasised that, in the UK context, 'It will be for private sector companies to make the necessary investment decisions within the regulatory framework set by the Government', and that the task for government is to ensure that the regulatory framework provides the right incentives(Department of Trade and Industry, 2006, p. 92 et seq.) . It suggested a number of possible policy initiatives to reduce policy and regulatory uncertainty, to send stronger market signals relating to the value of low carbon investments, and to improve the quality of forward looking market information. It also concluded, however, that the current electricity market framework would be capable of continuing to deliver the appropriate investments, and that 'the case for [government] intervention on grounds of security of supply has not been made' (ibid., p. 95).
The review process effectively ended with the release of a second White Paper in 2007
(Department of Trade and Industry, 2007) . It reached similar conclusions to the review regarding the risks to energy security arising from inadequate or inappropriate electricity supply investments, and saw no need to make major changes to the electricity market framework. Policy proposals were consequently aimed at reducing 'policy and regulatory uncertainties' by 'strengthening the EU ETS and the carbon market'; providing information to facilitate investment in new generating capacity; reform of the energy planning system; and clarifying policy on renewables, carbon capture and storage and nuclear power it released a consultation paper, setting out its conclusions from a year of study through Project Discovery (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2010a). It states, contrary to the White Paper of three years earlier:
We have identified a number of concerns with the current arrangements and have concluded that significant action will be called for given the unprecedented challenges facing the electricity and gas industries. We are keen to work with consumers, industry and government to find the best way forward. Prompt action will reduce the risk to energy supplies and environmental objectives, and can help reduce costs to consumers.
In a press release accompanying the publication of the consultant paper, Ofgem was more outspoken (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, 2010b):
 Ofgem recommends far reaching energy market reforms to consumers, industry and government;
 The unprecedented combination of the global financial crisis, tough environmental targets, increasing gas import dependency and the closure of ageing power stations has combined to cast reasonable doubt over whether the current energy arrangements will deliver secure and sustainable energy supplies  Prompt action will reduce risk to energy supplies, help lower costs to consumers and help progress towards climate change targets.
The body of the paper examines a number of different options for major changes to the UK gas and electricity markets, all of which involve substantial changes to both structure and operation, with a greater degree of government intervention. This could be seen as reversing the direction which UK energy policy had followed for the preceding twenty years and an acknowledgment that highly liberalised energy markets may not be capable of achieving major emission reductions while maintaining supply security. Adding a price on emissions to these market structures may achieve marginal emission reductions without endangering supply security. The large and rapid changes to the energy system, which achieving significant emission reductions will necessitate, will in turn require more far-reaching changes to institutional structures and policy settings, if supply security is to be maintained.
Consistent with the integrated energy and climate change policy approach, the options are assessed against criteria which include confidence of achieving supply security, confidence of achieving the 2020 emissions reduction targets through domestic reductions, and confidence of achieving the 2020 renewables targets.
The new government which took office following the election in May 2010 was no less committed than its predecessor to achieving deep cuts in emissions, and appeared to attach greater urgency to addressing the emissions reduction/supply security dilemma. In its first of a promised series of annual energy statements, released in July 2010, it strongly emphasised the need to ensure secure supplies of electricity, which it saw as being achieved both by increased energy efficiency and stronger incentives for private investment in new, Twenty years ago Australia embarked on a program to introduce market liberalisation to both the electricity and gas industries. Vertically integrated statutory monopolies, owned by State governments, were turned into disaggregated businesses, competing in generation and retailing, and in some states were privatised. Starting in 1998, the National Electricity Market (NEM) was introduced, as an integrated wholesale market covering over 90 per cent of Australian electricity consumption in eastern and southern Australia (the geographically isolated electricity supply systems in Western Australia and the Northern Territory are excluded). This embraces full competition at both wholesale (between generators) and at retail (between suppliers of electricity to consumers). There is similar retail competition in the supply of gas and increasing competition at wholesale with the discovery and development of new gasfields and the construction of a more inter-connected pipeline network.
The competitive market frameworks for electricity and gas are set respectively by the National Electricity Law and the National Gas Law. This framework is an agreement between the federal government and all state and territory governments, and its application extends to the whole country, not just those parts covered by the National Electricity Market. They are the key foundation documents for Australian domestic energy policy. Each contains succinct statements of the objective of the liberalisation policy, as follows.
7-National electricity market objective
The objective of this Law is to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, electricity services for the long term interests of consumers of electricity with respect to-(a) price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of electricity; and (b) the reliability, safety and security of the national electricity system. 
23-National gas objective
The objective of this Law is to promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, natural gas services for the long term interests of consumers of natural gas with respect to price, quality, safety, reliability and security of supply of natural gas.
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It is noteworthy that neither of these objectives contains any reference to climate change or other environmental concerns. This was a conscious and deliberate decision of the Ministerial Council on Energy, the body responsible for the two Laws, at the time when they were being The objectives are very important because, under the respective Laws, the body responsible for making the market Rules may only make Rules which will or are likely to contribute to the achievement of the objectives and, more generally, must have regard to the objectives when performing its functions (Ministerial Council on Energy, 2004b).
The consequence of this framework is that, contrary to the approach advocated by the IEA and adopted by the United Kingdom, climate change mitigation is entirely external to the Australia domestic energy policy process and divorced from, rather than integrated with the key energy policy objectives, including energy security. This approach to energy policy was fully reflected in the ( are not published) (Syed et al., 2010) . When generic emission factors are applied to the projected mix of primary fuels, it is found that the projected growth in primary energy demand implies an increase in energy combustion emissions of about 21 per cent above 2008 levels and 38 per cent above 2000 levels. In other words, far from reducing energy emissions below current levels, the projection suggests that they will increase significantly, notwithstanding a price on emissions applied through the government's proposed emissions trading scheme. By implication emission caps under the scheme could only be met by purchase on the world market of large volumes of CERs, or other internationally recognised credits. The official economic modelling undertaken as part of the design process for the emissions trading scheme, confirms that this was indeed the expectation of the schemes designers (Australian Treasury, 2008) .
In designing its CPRS, the government considered the possible impact of the Scheme on energy security, and took advice on the issue from the various agencies responsible for administering and operating the national electricity and gas markets. It also received submissions from owners of coal fired power stations, which argues that imposition of a price on emissions would result in devaluation of their generation assets and reduced creditworthiness of their businesses, which could cause the retirement of plant before replacement plant could be installed, with obvious negative effects on electricity supply security. In response, the government decided to provide the most severely affected generators with financial assistance, in the form of a quota of administratively allocated permits, with the quantity allocated depending on the emission intensity of the individual generator (more emissions intensive plant would receive more permits) and extending over five years, provided that the plant continued to operate for that period (Australian Government, 2008) . With that provision, the government then concluded that:
Energy security can be maintained through the setting of a target range for emissions cuts that allows for a smooth transition to lower-emissions technology.
Any minor amendments that are required to the energy market frameworks can be accommodated within the current rules amendment processes (Australian Government, 2008, pp 13-48.) A separate official assessment of energy security concluded that this assistance, together with the detailed information about CPRS design provided by the government, would provide investors with the information and confidence they would require to make timely and appropriate investment decisions, thereby mitigating risks to electricity supply security Notwithstanding the conclusions about the adequacy of supply security under the arrangement proposed for the CPRS, electricity generation businesses continued to argue that they required more generous assistance if risks to supply security were to be avoided. It argued that the proposed Scheme did not:
adequately address the stranding of coal-fired generation assets. A measured transition to full auctioning (as proposed in most other schemes to date) would enable a greater volume of permits to be administratively allocated to affected generators to ensure there is no disproportionate loss of economic value on the sector's balance sheets or a rise in costs to such a level as to compromise both the ability to refinance, and/ or re-invest in existing power plant (National Generators Forum, 2009 ).
In a political compromise, made in an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to achieve
Parliamentary support for the passage of its CPRS legislation, the government, proposed to increase the number of administratively allocated permits supplied to emissions intensive generators and to extend the duration of such assistance, and hence the potential operating life of these generators, to ten years. Responding to a formal invitation to comment on these proposals, the Australian Energy Markets Commission observed that 'there remains the potential risk that [the proposed assistance] may slow the transition away from carbonintensive generation. ' (Australian Energy Markets Commission, 2009b) There are several interesting aspects to this denouement. Firstly, the perceived risks to electricity supply security arise from possible damage to the financial integrity of the owners of emissions intensive power stations. It has never been suggested that, in a hypothetical worst case situation (bankruptcy of an owner), the physical asset of the power station, under new ownership, would be incapable of continuing to operate. Secondly, the generation assets which, it has been suggested, might be at risk of closure are all privately owned. It has never been suggested that any of the coal fired generators which are publicly owned (by the State governments of New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia) might be at risk of closure. 7 While the question of whether the benefits of liberalised energy markets can only be realised if all market participants are privately owned is a regular topic of public debate in Australia, it has received little attention in the particular context of energy security and climate change.
More generally, it is clear that, in the Australian policy context, responding to climate change is not only treated as external to and separate from energy policy, but that it is also seen as an issue of lower priority than preserving the economic benefits which are considered to flow from retaining and strengthening the liberalised market framework for the electricity and gas supply industries.
Conclusions
The risk of severely disruptive climate change cannot be reduced without making changes to energy systems, so as to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, which in terms of both size and speed of the changes required are so large as to constitute, in the words of the IEA, an 'energy revolution'. Revolutionary changes are likely to be disruptive of established energy systems, and to the services they provide, of which energy security is amongst the most important. However, as the IEA has been arguing for over a decade, energy security and climate policy goals can and should be integrated because both are addressed by policies which emphasise increasing end use efficiency and greater use of renewable sources of energy. That said, realising these synergies on a scale and at a rate which is 'revolutionary' is unlikely to leave unaffected the existing institutional structures and governance arrangements of the energy system. As the two national case studies presented here show, this is particularly true for states with a liberalised energy market framework.
In recent years, the United Kingdom, which has set itself relatively ambitious goals to reduce emissions by domestic action, has changed its policy framework so as to integrate energy security and climate policy goals, as advocated by the IEA. However, the United Kingdom faces a further challenge to maintain the security of electricity supply, in particular, while it transforms its energy system. With a liberalised market framework for the electricity supply industry, government options to affect the nature and level of energy system investments are necessarily indirect, and the outcomes of any particular government actions are uncertain, depending as they must on the decisions of multiple market participants. This problem was recognised by Ofgem in 2009 and, following the election of May 2010, the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat government has acknowledged the seriousness of the problem and committed itself to addressing it by changing the electricity market structure in ways which will necessarily be more interventionist.
In Australia, by contrast, the energy policy framework deliberately and explicitly treats climate change response as external to energy policy, making it effectively impossible to integrate energy security and climate-policy goals, and ensuring that climate policy presents no challenge to the pursuit of further market liberalisation. It is hardly surprising, then, that the national political process has failed to produce a commitment to strong emissions reduction goals or policies which will do more than curb the steady growth of energy related emissions. What is more, both the government and the opposition parties expect purchasing international emissions units to play an important part in achieving, in accounting terms, more ambitious emissions reductions.
The overall conclusion is very simple. If states set themselves ambitious emissions reduction goals they will need to make radical changes to their energy systems, which, in the absence of decisive policy action, are likely to be deleterious to domestic energy security. By contrast, modest reduction goals will not require far-reaching energy system changes and will pose little threat to energy security, but will also do little to mitigate climate change.
